ByWangXinyuanTheRussia-Ukraineconflictcontinuestorage,seriouslyaffectingregionalsecurityandtheworldeconomy.NATO,hauntedbyitsColdWarmentality,iswidelyrecognizedasthemainculpritbehindtheoutbreakoftheconflictanditsescalation.Despitetheworseningsituation,NATO,ledbytheUnitedStates,iscontributingnothingtopeacefullyendingtheconflict.Contrarily,ithastakentheopportunitytoflauntthevalsueofitsexistence,increasethemilitaryspendinganddeploymentofitsmembercountries,andacceleratethepaceofextendingNATO’sArticle5totheAsia-PacificregioninordertoserveU.S.hegemony.NATOheldasummitattheendoflastmonthinMadridandincludedChinainitsStrategicConceptdocumentforthefirsttime,arguingthatChinaposesachallengetoNATO’s“security,interestsandvalues”andcallingforunitedeffortsagainstthe“systemicchallenges”posedbyChina.ItwasalsothefirsttimethatNATOinvitedtheleadersoffourAsia-Pacificcountries,Japan,SouthKorea,AustraliaandNewZealand,toitssummit.InthecontextofintensifiedstrategiccompetitionwithChina,theU.S.ispushingNATOtoextenditstentaclestotheregionandbydoingsoithasfullyrevealeditsstrategicintentto“containChinawithNATO”.Itshouldbenotedthattheso-calledStrategicConceptdocumentisfilledwithconfrontationalconcepts,ColdWarmentalityandideologicalbias.ThedocumentissodisconnectedfromrealityanditsmearsChinafornoreasonatall.TheU.S.-ledNATOistryingtoconjureupathreatinEuropesoitcanprovokeconfrontationintheAsia-Pacificregion–this,ratherthanChina,isthereal“systemicchallenge”topeace,stability,developmentandprosperityintheAsia-Pacificregion.DisruptingWorldPeaceTheStrategicConceptistheguidingdocumentforNATO.AftertheColdWar,therehadbeenthree“strategicconcepts”adoptedin1991,1999and2010.NATOtoutsthedocumentsasanactionto“fulfilnewmissions,admitnewmembersandexpandnewfunctions”andtopromotethetransformationofthealliance.Toputmoreaccurately,it’savividrecountofhowthedocumenthasservedasatoolforNATOtoshowitssubserviencetotheU.S.andhelpmaintaintheU.S.globalhegemonyanditsinterests;andthatNATOhasbeencompletelyreducedtoatooltocreate“enemies”andfabricate“threats”,andbringharmtoregionalandglobalsecurity.In1991,theNATORomeSummitadoptedtheAlliance’sNewStrategicConcept,thefirst“strategicconcept”documentissuedbyNATOaftertheendoftheColdWar,proposingthatNATO’smilitarystrategyshiftedfrom“forwarddefense”oftheColdWartoincreasedmobilitytorespondtointernationalcrises,whichlaidthefoundationforlarge-scalemilitaryinterventionsinthefuture.Soonthereafter,NATOinterveneddirectlyinthecivilwarinBosniaandHerzegovinaunderthepretenseofhumanitarianism,helpingtheU.S.todominatethesituationintheBalkansregion.Attheturnofthecenturyin1999,theU.S.ledthesecond“transformation”ofNATO,whosenewStrategicConceptforthe21stCenturyemphasizedthatNATOshouldplayanimportantroleindefendingdemocracy,freedomandhumanrights,turningNATOintoatooltopromoteWesternvalues.Atthesametime,thedocumentsuggestedthatNATO’sactionstomaintainpeaceandsecurity,whennecessary,couldextendbeyondmemberstates,makingpossiblethe“interventionist”and“expansionist”NATOmilitaryoperationsoutsidethedefensezoneinthenameofgroupsecurity.Alsoin1999,NATO,ledbytheU.S.,launchedairstrikesagainsttheformerYugoslaviawithouttheapprovaloftheUNSecurityCouncil.Astheworld’slargestmilitaryalliance,NATO’ssurvivalisdrivenbyadversariesandthreats,andafter9/11highlightednon-conventionalsecuritythreats,counter-terrorismbecamethemissionofNATOandthereasontojustifyitsaggressionofsovereignstates.Inthenameofcounter-terrorism,NATOlaunchedmilitaryoperationsagainstAfghanistan,Iraq,andLibya......notonlytakingmorethan800,000lives,butalsoresultinginvolatilesituationsintheMiddleEastandotherregions.NowondertheU.S.-ledglobalcounter-terrorismstuckintothestrangecircleof“themorecounter-terrorismfights,themoreterroristthreats”.Italsounveiledhowunjustplotsofregimechangearecarriedoutunderthejustcoverofcounter-terrorism.In2008,theUnitedStatesandotherWesterncountriesborethebruntoftheinternationalfinancialcrisis,althoughthe“strategicconcept”documentadoptedinthesameyearnolongerconsideredRussiaasthemainthreat,theU.S.knewitstensionswithRussiawasahinderancetoU.S.hegemonyoverEuropeandtheverysurvivalofNATO.That’swhyNATOdidn’tstopitseastwardexpansion,andeventually,itbuiltandpushedthestrategiccontainmentlinetothedoorstepsofRussia.AftertheCrimeancrisisin2014,NATOhasbeenincreasingitsmilitarysupporttoUkraine,squeezingRussia’ssecurityspaceandignoringRussia’slegitimatesecurityconcerns,whicheventuallytriggeredtheRussia-Ukraineconflictin2022.Hyping“ChinaThreat”TheorySince2017,theU.S.nationalsecuritystrategyhasquicklyshiftedfromcounterterrorismandregionalaffairstoconventionalgreatpowercompetition.SinceBidentookoffice,theU.S.hasfocusedon“greatpowercompetition”and“long-termcompetition”withChinaandotheradversaries.ItviewsNATOasthemostimportantstrategictoolformaintainingitsglobalhegemony,henceintensifieditscoordinationwithNATOalliesagainstChina,andurgedNATOtocompetewithChina.DuetoitssecuritydependenceonandthecontinuedpressurefromtheU.S.,NATO’sattitudetowardChinatookasharpturninashortperiodoftime,andhasbecomeincreasinglyassertive,despitethefactthatChinaisfarfromasecuritythreattoEuropeancountries.InNATO’slatest“StrategicConcept”document,Chinawasconsidereda“systemicthreat”toEuro-Atlanticsecurity,notonlyintraditionalsecurityareas,butalsoin“China’squesttocontrolkeytechnologiesandindustrialsectors,criticalinfrastructure,strategicgoodsandsupplychains,”and“China’sattempttosubverttherules-basedinternationalorder”.The“ChinaThreat”iscompletelygroundless.Chinahasalwaysbeenapositiveforceforpeacefuldevelopmentintheworld.Inthefaceoftheoverlappingchallengesbroughtbychanginggeopoliticallandscapesandaonce-in-a-centurypandemic,Chinahasneversurrenderedtostrength,neverengagedinblocpoliticsorconfrontation,andneverresortedto“decoupling”or“buildingwallsforasmallyard”.Quitetheopposite,ithasprovidedalargenumberofpublicgoodstomaintainworldpeaceandstability,andtoadvanceglobalsustainabledevelopment.The“ChinaThreat”thenquicklybecameapretextandtoolforNATOtobridgeitslegitimacygap,topromotea“globalizedNATO”,andtogobeyondthetraditionalgeopoliticalandarmsrace.DespitetheongoingUkrainecrisis,NATOSecretaryGeneralJensStoltenberghasrepeatedlysaidthat“NATOwillincorporatethe‘responsetoChina’srise’intoitsnewstrategicconcept,”andbluntlystatedthatitwouldbeafuturepriority.Thenew“StrategicConcept”will,notsurprisingly,serveasabasisforNATO’scontinuedexistenceinthefuture.Thenew“strategicconcept”showsNATOcontinuestoindulgeitselfintheColdWarmindset.NATOismorewillingtopictureChinaasa“threat”thantoworkwithChinatoaddresscommon,non-traditionalsecuritychallenges.Itisalsomorewillingtoemphasizeitsowndominationofthesecurityorderthantoconstructamoreinclusiveregionalsecurityorder.Byprovokingcontradictionsandideologicalconfrontationsofvalues,NATOisattemptingtore-playthe“campconfrontation”gameintheAsia-Pacificregion.SeverelyUnderminingAsia-PacificSecurityTheRussia-Ukraineconflicthasbeengoingonformorethanfivemonthsnow.Ratherthanshoulderingupinternationalresponsibilitytoresolvetheissuethroughpeacefuldialogue,NATOkeepsaddingfueltothefireandpushinguptheriskofcomplicatingandprolongingtheconflict.Moreregrettably,theconflictseemstohaveprovidedanopportunityfortheU.S.toreshapeNATOandextenditstentaclestotheAsia-Pacificregion,thusmakingitbetterserveU.S.hegemony.Inthe“Indo-PacificStrategy”documentreleasedbytheBidenadministrationatthebeginningofthisyear,itwasclearlyproposedthatthe“Indo-PacificStrategy”welcomestheparticipationofNATO.The“Indo-PacificStrategy”isessentiallyatooloftheU.S.tofuelitscompetitionwithChinaattheregionallevel.AsNATOmaintainsitspositionthatChinaposesa“systemicchallenge”,itwouldnaturallystrengthenitsmilitarypresenceintheregion,provoke“campconfrontation”andcontinuetoundermineChina’ssecurityenvironmentandcontainChina’sdevelopment–theimpactofwhichwillcertainlynotgounnoticed.Inrecentyears,theU.S.hascontinuedtodeepenits“Indo-PacificStrategy”andhascontinuouslyemphasizedthatalliancesandsecuritypartnershipsarethemostimportant“asymmetriccompetitiveedge”againstChina.That’swhyithasstrengtheneditsbilateralmilitaryalliances,theAUKUSandtheQUADmechanismsandotherstructuresintheAsia-Pacificregion,andhasstrengthenedthetiesbetweenNATOanditsalliesintheregion.TheNATOMadridSummitforthefirsttimeinvitedtheleadersofJapan,SouthKorea,AustraliaandNewZealand,andduringthesummittalkofthe“NATOAsia-PacificPartnership(AP4)”,NATOvoweddeeperdefensecoordinationandcooperationwithAsiaPacificallies.Inaddition,sincetheRussia-Ukraineconflict,theU.S.hastoutedthat“thesecurityanddefenseofEuropeandtheIndo-Pacificregionareinextricablylinked”andthat“UkrainetodaymaybeEastAsiatomorrow”.Byhypingupthe“securitythreats”facingtheregion,theU.S.isencouragingNATOmemberstoincreasetheirmilitarypresenceinAsiaPacific.Asthemostdynamicandpromisingregionintheworld,Asia-PacificisalsotheregionwheretheinterestsofChinaandtheUnitedStatesaremostintertwined.Theprosperityandstabilityoftheregionisofgreatimportanceandfar-reachingsignificancetotheworld.Tomaintainnationalsecurityandregionalpeace,countriesintheregionhave,foralongtime,exercisedconsiderablerestraintintheirsecuritypolicies,i.e.enhancingmilitarystrengthwhileavoidingarmsrace.Asforsecuritycooperation,theyhopetohavecertainsecuritysupportbutrefrainfromformingnewmilitaryalliances,noraretheywillingto“choosesides”betweenChinaandtheUnitedStates.Onthisbasis,ithasbecometheconsensusoftheregiontobuildaninstitutionalsystemthatsafeguardsregionalsecurityandstability,promotesintra-regionalcooperation,andrestrainssecuritybehaviorsofmembercountries.However,inthecurrentprocessofNATO’sIndo-Pacificization,theUnitedStateshasincreasinglytieditsAsia-PacificalliestoNATO,attemptingtocreatea“smallbloc”and“politicalgroup”againstChina,instigatingcountriesintheregiontoadoptamoreoffensivemilitarypolicy,andforcingthemto“takesides”betweenChinaandtheUnitedStates,andpushingupdrasticallytheriskofcampconfrontation.TheAsia-PacificregionhasaverydifferentgeopoliticalenvironmentandsecurityissuesthanEurope.TheU.S.andNATOhaveoverestimatedtheirabilityindeliveringpublicgoodstotheregion,andareoverlyoptimisticinbelievingthatstrengthenedmilitarypresencewouldequaltotheabilityinaddressingmultipletraditionalandnon-traditionalsecurityissuesintheregion.ComparedtoworkingwithChinaandASEANthroughdialogueandconsultation,increasingNATOactivitiesintheregionwillonlyexacerbateregionaltensions.Editor:ZhangZhouDisclaimerTheviewsandopinionsexpressedinthisarticlearethoseoftheauthor's,GMW.cnmakesnorepresentationsastoaccuracy,suitability,orvalidityofanyinformationonthissiteandwillnotbeliableforanyerrors,omissions,ordelaysinthisinformation.